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Drivers of Strategic Contestation: 
The Case of South America1 
 
 
Daniel Flemes and Leslie Wehner 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyses what the drivers of contestation of secondary powers vis-à-vis the 
regional power are, differentiating therein between structural, historical, behavioural, and 
domestic such drivers. We argue that in regions characterized by relative stability where 
major interstate violent conflicts are unlikely, as is the case in South America, secondary 
powers rely mainly on soft-balancing mechanisms vis-à-vis the regional power. Whereas 
Brazil’s foreign policy behaviour is key to South American secondary powers being induced 
to contest the country’s powerhood, the choices that the foreign policy elites of those 
secondary powers make regarding what the specific expression of soft balancing is to be are 
influenced by certain domestic groups. Empirical examples are given of Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia and Venezuela as secondary powers unfold these domestic drivers, which shape 
their different ways of soft balancing Brazil. The article thus explains why some secondary 
powers rely more on institutional binding, others on economic statecraft, or buffering, while 
others contest by offering and building alternative leadership proposals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article investigates the systemic and domestic drivers underpinning the accommodative 
strategies of contestation that secondary powers employ vis-à-vis regional powers (see 
Lobell, Williams and Jesse, this special issue). It analyses the variance in the strategic 
responses of secondary powers to the regional power in regions experiencing low levels of 
conflict. The theoretical argument presented elaborates on the interplay between the 
opportunities available to secondary actors, systemic and sub-systemic forces by unpacking 
the motives and dynamics that drive the diverging responses of Argentina, Chile, Colombia 
and Venezuela – countries that rely on the enactment of soft-balancing behaviour towards 
Brazil. These countries are secondary powers, defined as the second most powerful states in 
the regional hierarchy, whose position is determined by their relative material and/or 
ideational capabilities (Ebert et al., forthcoming; Flemes, 2009).  
 The article advances the argument that hostile approaches – in the form of hard-
balancing behaviour – are not part of the secondary powers’ strategies in regions where major 
interstate wars are unlikely to occur due to the existence of a climate of relative stability. 
Instead, secondary powers’ status positions are linked to playing the role of soft-balancer 
(Wehner, forthcoming) vis-à-vis a regional power in those regions where rivalry is replaced 
by competitive patterns. Thus, soft balancing is not a revisionist strategy designed to 
reconfigure the regional order; rather, it only aims to hamper and constrain the further rise of 
the regional power (see Shaw, this special issue). The purpose of soft balancing is to even out 
or ameliorate the existing asymmetric distribution of power, and to frustrate the most 
powerful actor’s fulfilment of its foreign policy goals by increasing its costs of action (see 
Lobell, Jesse and Williamson, this special issue; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). 
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Soft balancing includes a pool of discursive and institutional instruments, such as the 
formation of limited diplomatic coalitions so as to constrain the superior power (Flemes, 
2011, 406ff.). ‘Buffering’ aims to extend weaker states’ room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis 
stronger states (Greenfield, 1983). It also involves the use of economic means – that is, 
economic statecraft – by strengthening economic ties between those peers questioning the 
legitimacy of unilateral policies (Saltzman, 2012). ‘Entangling diplomacy’ refers to the use of 
the rules and procedures of international institutions to influence the primary state’s foreign 
policy choices (Paul, 2005, 57). ‘Binding’ strategies aim to restrain stronger states through 
the concluding of institutional agreements (Ikenberry 2003). 
South American secondary powers’ soft-balancing might be driven by different factors. 
On this basis, foreign policy theory scrutinizes the balance between existing domestic and 
systemic drivers. These encompass structural, historical, behavioural and domestic drivers of 
contestation, yet the most generalizable characteristic of a state’s international behaviour is 
still its relative position in the international system (Zakaria, 1992, 482). Thus, we show that 
the international and regional systems tend to narrow the choices of secondary powers to 
contest the regional power. However, secondary powers are still responsive to domestic 
groups. The secondary powers’ room to choose its best possible strategy and still allow the 
influence of domestic groups can be observed in these states’ selection of the policy-area to 
contest the regional power. We also show that domestic politics can triumph over systemic 
and regional forces whenever the environment surrounding these states’ relations is low 
conflict and peace driven, though it still shows competition between state actors. 
Secondary powers have a two-sided systemic position. On the one hand, they formulate 
their foreign policy under the condition of factual, perceived and/or anticipated inferiority to 
the primary power and on the other, likewise regarding their superiority to the other states of 
the region (Ebert et al., forthcoming). This article assumes that if a region consists of one 
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primary and more than one secondary power, then the secondary powers’ relative systemic 
positions do not deviate considerably from each other.  Thus, the relative position of each is 
not the most decisive factor in the apparent variation in regional secondary powers’ chosen 
strategies, though the regional distribution of power might narrow the range of alternative 
options available. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that sub-regional systems show 
similar dynamics to those of the international system, as they are ultimately embedded in that 
all-encompassing structure (Jesse et al., 2012, 8–9).  
Thus, domestic actors have the greatest impact on foreign policy in times of peace and 
stability (Ripsman, 2009, 186). In a security-abundant environment, the costs of allowing 
domestic actors to contribute to the making of foreign policy are low and the foreign policy 
executive (FPE) will hence be more willing to make concessions to domestic groups. Put 
different, this responsiveness to powerful domestic groups’ choices may explain the variance 
of secondary powers’ responses, specifically in terms of the tactics that are employed as part 
of the soft-balancing mechanisms.  
 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: First, the underlying causes of 
secondary powers’ contestation are analyzed, moving from hard to soft-balancing; in this 
section the structural and historical drivers of contestation in the South American region are 
presented. Further, the article also pays attention to the regional power’s foreign policy 
behaviour as being key to inducing the contestation of secondary powers, a claim which is 
subsequently illustrated through taking up the case of Brazil. Second, the domestic factors 
triggering contestation and explaining the variance in the ways that secondary powers soft 
balance regional powers are also developed, and are then connected to brief empirical 
examples from Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela – secondary powers all contesting 
Brazil’s rise. Finally, the article analyzes the validity of the theoretical argument in light of 
the cases presented. 
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DRIVERS OF SECONDARY POWERS’ CONTESTATION  
 
Structural and Historical Drivers  
 
Regional uni-, bi- and multipolarity may stimulate secondary powers to pursue different 
forms of contestation (see Lobell, Jesse and Williams, this special issue; Ebert et al., 
forthcoming; Flemes and Wojczewski, 2011). A unipolar security cluster is likely to make 
secondary powers contest the dominance of a certain state, whereas under conditions of 
regional multipolarity it might be difficult to identify a single appropriate target of 
contestation. However, a road to multipolarity unfolding may trigger competition for 
predominance, as secondary powers attempt to acquire the necessary capabilities to be able to 
match the regional power. In situations of regional bipolarity – in which one of the existing 
secondary powers develops capabilities that surpass those of the rest of the secondary powers, 
done with the purpose of matching the power of the regionally predominant state – 
contestation is two-dimensional. First, the secondary powers tend to constrain the accession 
of the dominant secondary power to regional ‘powerhood’. Second, the existing regional 
power will also unfold strategies to hamper the dominant secondary power’s transition to 
regional power, such as coordinating with other secondary powers or becoming directly 
cooperative  with the new challenger in order to constrain any potential negative effects for 
the regional power from these developments. 
Strategies of contestation can be driven by historical experiences of conflict, and also by 
their legacies. Historical drivers must be seen as directly connected to the behavioural drivers 
of contestation, as secondary powers interpret historical experiences in light of the current 
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relationship between given states (Hwang, 2003). Secondary powers that have been victims 
of the regional power’s aggression in the past may not accept the latter’s contemporary claim 
to leadership. Negative historical experiences and unresolved conflicts are likely to give rise 
to impressions of rivalry, which become part of the collective memory of the secondary 
power (He, 2008). Hence, threat perceptions held by secondary powers manifest in their 
chosen security strategies. Alternatively, military and defence cooperation between the 
regional and the secondary power in terms of exchanges of personnel or joint manoeuvres 
hint at a certain degree of mutual trust.  
The type of regional polarity and the security order in which the relationships between 
Brazil and the South American region’s secondary powers are embedded have not changed 
significantly during the last decade. What changed is the US presence in South America. The 
US’ priorities in other regions because of the war on terror gave enough room for Brazil to 
extend its leadership in South America despite the US still shows a degree of engagement as 
global hegemon on this region (see Lobell, Jesse and Wiliams, this special issue). Moreover, 
historical drivers of contestation are not key in this regional setting. Consequently, the major 
policy shifts on the part of the secondary powers with regard to Brazil in the last decade are 
not connected to any significant historical or structural drivers; instead, it is the regional 
power’s chosen foreign policy behaviour that may be the key to understanding the grounds 
for others’ contestation in South America. 
 
Foreign Policy Behaviour Triggering Contestation: Brazil’s Actions  
 
The contestation strategies of the secondary powers can be caused by the chosen foreign and 
security policy behaviour of the primary power. Whereas the dependence of the secondary 
power on the primary power makes strategic contestation less likely, a direct security threat 
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posed to the secondary state by the primary power is the strongest driver of contestation. The 
regional power can threaten the secondary power’s core interests, such as territorial integrity 
and natural resources. Primary powers can also actively engage in intra-regional coalitions or 
military alliances with adversaries of the secondary power, either intentionally or 
involuntarily resulting in the isolation of the latter (Arquilla and Fuller, 1996). In the same 
way, the primary power’s special relationships with those extra-regional great powers seen as 
foes by the secondary power are likely to trigger the latter’s contestation (Alecu de Flers and 
Regelsberger, 2005). In this case, the secondary power’s reaction will be influenced by the 
difference between its own and the primary power’s threat perception with regard to the 
influence of the extra-regional power in question (Press-Barnathan, 2006, 308). In addition, 
secondary states are likely to contest in cases where the primary power abandons the ‘rule-
based order and act[s] unilaterally on a global scale’ (Ikenberry, 2003, 5). 
Moreover, passive behaviour on the part of a regional power can also trigger politics of 
contestation. Hence, it is assumed that an implicit or explicit claim to leadership must be 
substantiated as part of the rising power’s regional strategy. If the most powerful state does 
not at least partially provide public goods (see Alden and Schoeman, this special issue), 
secondary powers will tend to contest the perceived use of the region as a power base for the 
rising power’s global ambitions.  
The more types of regional public goods that the regional power may provide, the less 
intense the politics of contestation on the part of the secondary power will be. The regional 
power can avoid contestation by: (i) providing public goods such as relative stability and 
infrastructure to its region and to pay a high proportion of the economic costs of cooperation 
(distributional leadership); (ii) sharing power with secondary states by including them in 
regional decision-making processes through multilateral summits, intergovernmental 
institutions or dual leadership patterns (multilateral leadership); (iii) projecting norms and 
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values based on its legitimacy and moral authority that include the ideational beliefs of the 
potential followers in order to gain their acceptance for a regional project (ideational 
leadership); or, (iv) guiding discussions based on inclusion, bridge political and ideological 
cleavages and articulate a pluralist agenda that leads to a discourse on regional consensus 
creation (consensual leadership). 
For example, Brazil’s willingness to provide public goods (distributional leadership) 
differs according to the issue-area under consideration. Brasilia is not ready to pay the costs 
of economic integration of groups like the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), but 
it is willing do whatever is necessary to secure regional stability (Flemes and Wojczewski, 
2011, 12). This country also provides regional stability through its various mediation 
engagements and security cooperation initiatives (see Merke, this special issue). Additionally, 
Brazil invests in the public goods of regional energy security and infrastructure (Initiative for 
the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America, IIRSA).  
The acceptance of Brazil’s leadership in South America also depends on its ability to 
bridge political and ideological cleavages through the unfolding of an ideational leadership 
project. In this regard, Brasilia tries to guide the states of the region towards the shared goal 
of realizing a South American space. Brazil has to this end successfully established a regional 
consensus on democracy, human rights, development, the eco-social market economy and 
regionalized responses to the challenges of economic globalization (Flemes, 2009; Burges, 
2008). 
Nevertheless, the articulated discourse of justice and democracy is currently not being 
put into practice – ultimately because Brazil is not building inclusive and democratic 
institutions. In fact, regional groups such as the MERCOSUR and the Union of South 
American States (UNASUR) led by Brazil do not have significant competencies. Brazil leads 
these institutions without making economic concessions or transferring sovereignty to them 
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(see Burges, this special issue). Therefore, it currently provides multilateral leadership only to 
a limited degree, done through intergovernmental summits and institutions (Flemes, 2009, 
171). 
Thus, Brazil’s low-key multilateral leadership and its selective distributional leadership 
are crucial factors behind others’ contestation in a region characterized by a low level of 
conflict. However, Brazil does not discriminate between the relevant secondary powers in its 
(limited) provision of this multilateral and distributional leadership. What in reality varies, 
therefore, are the secondary powers’ expectations and perceptions of Brazil’s behaviour and 
leadership provision. 
 
Domestic Drivers of Contestation: South American Secondary Powers’ Own Circumstances  
 
Endogenous forces may also have an impact on the types of contestation secondary powers 
unfold towards the primary power. Rose (1998, 161) argues that the magnitude of the impact 
of these endogenous forces always depends on ‘the state apparatus and its relation to the 
surrounding society’. The relative autonomy of the FPE from the influence of domestic actors 
is also an important factor shaping the type of foreign policy strategies that a state chooses to 
enact. In fact, theoretically the relative autonomy of the government is expected to be more 
important than the type of regime is (Ripsman, 2009, 171). Thus, the more autonomy that a 
FPE has from domestic groups, the fewer concessions it has to make in the process of 
extracting the necessary resources to carry out security and foreign policies.  
Further, the possession of state power and making concessions to domestic groups are 
not without costs for the government (Taliaferro, 2007, 156). In this sense, the more 
influential domestic players will be those with sufficient power to remove national executives 
from office (whether through the ballot box or a coup d’état), those who can act as veto 
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players – and thus if so inclined obstruct the government’s programmatic goals – or those 
who can shape how national interests are defined. In non-democratic states, potential veto 
players such as powerful bureaucratic actors, religious leaders, economic elites and the 
military can obtain policy concessions from the executive (Ripsman, 2009, 185). In a 
democratic state, the legislature – either as a whole or through its key legislative committees 
on foreign affairs – might be a key veto player that is able to channel public opinion, 
including through harnessing the power and influence of single-issue interest groups and/or 
the media.  
Therefore,  changes of government brought about by elections, preferences for protecting 
relevant economic interests as well as those of the military and certain foreign policy groups, 
the stipulations of parliament and the demands of public opinion may all impact the way in 
which a secondary power contests or cooperates with the regional power in the context of 
regional affairs. Neoclassical realists argue that foreign policy choices also depend on the 
FPE’s perceptions of relative power, and thus not simply on absolute material resources 
(Rose, 1998, 147). Consequently, (mis)perceptions regarding the regional distribution of 
power and polarity can drive a state’s chosen strategy (see Blarel and Ebert, this special 
issue). The FPE might also be constrained since there is no internal consensus within it about 
the most appropriate assessment of the international environment. A change of government 
brings new leadership and elite perceptions, which affect the international behaviour of the 
state (Jervis, 1976) – especially when the new government has a different ideological 
orientation from the previous one; simultaneously, however, such change also opens up new 
directions in the foreign policy agenda. 
Foreign policy decision-makers and societal leaders in secondary states might also 
respond to shifts in the relative distribution of particular capabilities – specifically, to ones 
that threaten their core strategic interests. The perception of the primary state held by the 
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elites of the secondary state is, therefore, ‘in part a function of which component of power is 
rising’ (Lobell, 2009, 55). Specific examples of such components might include shifts in 
territorial boundaries, population, ideology and/or military or economic power (Spiegel, 
1972). For instance, economic elites may also push the state to pursue and promote a closer 
relationship with the emerging power if this primary actor’s economic growth potentially can 
have a positive influence on powerful economic actors from within the secondary state. On 
the contrary, if the primary regional actor pursues self-serving economic strategies that 
negatively affect influential domestic coalitions in the secondary state, then the government 
of the latter – in response to domestic pressures – may develop counter-policies so as to 
ameliorate exclusive economic dependence on the unsupportive regional power. 
An example of the influence of domestic groups in the politics of contestation is 
Argentina under the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner (2007–present). At first glance, structure may explain most of the chosen behaviour 
of Argentina vis-à-vis Brazil, given that they have previously had a relationship of 
competitive-partnership and that their long-term relationship has evolved from one of hard to 
one of soft balancing (Malamud, 2011; Russell and Tokatlian, 2003). Argentina has been soft 
balancing Brazil through the use of tactics of institutional binding, specifically as a result of 
the creation and development of the MERCOSUR on the basis of the two countries’ parity 
therein (Malamud, 2011). Argentina has also supported the launch of other groups that can 
serve to institutionally bind Brazil in South and Latin America respectively, such as the 
aforementioned UNASUR as well as the Community of Latin American States (CELAC) 
(Wehner, forthcoming; Tokatlian, 2013). Further, Argentina has also relied on buffering 
tactics by developing ties with peers such as Venezuela, which was fully incorporated into 
the MERCOSUR in 2012. However, Argentina has developed not only strong ideological 
affinities with Venezuela but also a relationship based on economic needs. Venezuela acted 
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as lender of last resort to Argentina when the latter experienced a severe currency crisis in 
2001 and was unable to access credits from multilateral institutions (Flemes and Wehner, 
2012). Such an alliance has also been used to reduce their asymmetric political and economic 
dependence on Brazil (Simonoff, 2008, 49), inasmuch as domestically driven economic 
problems in both countries have brought them closer together in recent years.  
As a consequence of the aforementioned economic crisis of 2001, the most pressing 
priority of the Argentinean government was the economic recovery and reindustrialization of 
the country. To this end, Argentina adopted the defensive economic strategy of trying to 
reduce its economic dependence on Brazil – its main trade partner – in order to protect (and 
retain the supportive of) part of Kirchner’s electoral base. Argentina favoured domestic 
economic coalitions from the industrial sector (producers and workers) reduced the impact of 
strong regional and international actors such as Brazil, the US and China by implementing 
such measures as the controlling of trade flows, the application of voluntary export restraints 
and the implementation of other ad hoc forms of economic protection (Flemes and Wehner, 
2012). Brazil adopted a tolerant position on this matter, as it had also been hit by the 
economic crisis (with the devaluation of its currency, the real) and itself adopted protectionist 
measures for its most vulnerable economic sectors (Guadagni et al., 2010, 15). However, 
these type of measures have since remained in place in Argentina even after the country’s 
eventual recovery, expressing in a way that economic statecraft is a key component of 
Argentina’s soft-balancing strategy when it comes to Brazil. 
Chile, meanwhile, has pursued a rather different path of contestation due to the influence 
of domestic politics vis-à-vis Brazil’s leadership (Flemes and Wehner, 2012), despite both it 
and Argentina being secondary powers and consequently both relying on a soft-balancing 
roles (Wehner, forthcoming). Like Argentina, Chile listens to its domestic economic groups – 
but, unlike its neighbour, it prioritizes the free trade group that is aligned in ethos with the 
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state interest and model of export promotion. Thus, Chile has determined its economic goals 
to lie first and foremost outside of Latin America, apparent from its negotiating of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with the different economic hubs and powerhouses of the world (Wehner, 
2011). Lately it has pursued the same strategy in the South American region, done by 
following the same path to FTAs and by supporting the Pacific Alliance – the latter is a 
commercial trade group (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) that aims at increasing intra-
regional trade, as much as it also seeks extra-regional trade opportunities in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Wehner, forthcoming).  
In the relationship with Brazil, Chile’s emphasis on FTAs represents its desire to retain 
its freedom to decide with whom it negotiates FTAs; Chile rejected Brazil’s invitation to join 
the MERCOSUR as a full member in 2000. This happened despite the fact that the 
MERCOSUR had since its inception been harbouring the aspiration that Chile would one day 
become a full member (Wehner, 2011). Instead, Chile decided to maintain its economic 
autonomy and thus chose to adopt only associate status (1996), reflecting a balking strategy 
in its turning down of Brazil’s repeated invitations to become a full member of the group 
(Lapp, 2012, 151). This meant that Chile could continue to avoid economic and possibly also 
political dependence on the MERCOSUR (Mullins, 2006, 123). This regional group does not 
allow members to negotiate FTAs outside of the regional platform, being part of which may 
have constrained Chile’s interests – and those of its pro-market domestic economic groups. 
Joining the MERCOSUR would also involve Chile having to adopt the higher tariff rates of 
the group, which would also have significant consequences for its own domestic importers 
(Wehner, 2011).  
Therefore, the Chilean strategy of soft balancing has been one based on the resort to 
economic statecraft and buffering. Chile chose to pursue the building of economic ties with 
the European Union, Japan and the United States in the early 1990s, followed later by the rest 
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of the Asia-Pacific countries; this overall strategy of diffusing and reducing economic and 
political dependences was designed to create room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the great and 
regional powers. Recently such an approach has become even more pronounced with the 
creation of the Pacific Alliance, wherewith Chile, Colombia and Peru have brought Mexico 
into Brazil’s sphere of influence as a potential contender to it (Wehner, forthcoming). Again, 
this strategy balances the structural needs of the Chilean state, and additionally serves the 
purposes of the domestic group of free traders – as the Pacific Alliance has a commercial 
vocation that also creates political consequences for the Brazil–Chile relationship. Finally, 
Chile has also relied on institutional binding mechanisms by giving support to the creation of 
the UNASUR and CELAC, and also by leading the security cooperation in the former (along 
with Argentina). Yet, Brazil has given the space to Argentina and Chile to lead this issue-
area, as it matches with its own security agenda. Nevertheless, Brazil has been reluctant to 
engage in the CELAC, whereas Chile and Argentina have welcomed such an initiative as a 
non-binding forum that constrains Brazil and places it and Mexico under the same 
institutional umbrella (see Tokatlian, 2013, 28).  
 Unlike Argentina and Chile, Colombia has had a passive relationship with Brazil –  
traditionally it bandwagons with the US for internal security reasons, which has given rise to 
distant relations with its South American neighbours as they look on the US playing a role in 
regional security matters with great scepticism (Cardona, 2011). In fact, Colombia was 
reluctant to countenance the idea of a UNASUR led by Brazil, as it was perceived by the 
country’s FPE as a platform both espousing an anti-American rhetoric and opposed to ‘Plan 
Colombia’ – a set of policies sponsored by the US to aid the fight against Colombian drug-
trafficking and paramilitary groups. Even though the military alliance with the US reflected 
in Plan Colombia was not directed against Brazil, it still by its mere existence undermined the 
regional power’s geostrategic interests in South America. Even up until Álvaro Uribe’s 
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presidency (2002–10), the main concern of the Colombian administration was the war on 
drugs and thus foreign policy was determined by US-backed security needs. Thus, if 
Colombia can be said to have contested Brazil’s leadership, it has done it on the basis of 
building alliances with third states (see Merke, this special issue) and not by cultivating a 
strong relationship with this regional power (Pastrana, 2011).  
However, under the Juan Manuel Santos administration (2010–present) a change in 
Colombian foreign policy priorities can be observed. The continued growth of negative 
public opinion and perception regarding the country’s relationship with the US, and of the 
rest of South American states with Colombia, has led the FPE to shift the focus away from 
the US and the related security agenda towards one that includes regional, commercial and 
security cooperation with its South American neighbours. However, Colombia’s involvement 
in South American affairs is not only driven by its seeking of partnerships but also by its 
aspiration to building up its leadership capacity (Pastrana and Vera, 2012, 188), which may 
implicitly be detrimental to Brazil’s own project in the long run. Moreover, Colombian 
domestic groups support this initiative as it is promotes a commercial agenda based on free 
trade. Yet, some important and traditional groups still advocate agriculture protectionism, 
especially if Colombia henceforth seeks to deepen its trade exchange with Brazil (Pastrana, 
2011, 11).  
Further, the new Colombian FPE agenda also goes beyond allying with Brazil alone, 
as domestic pro-FTAs groups have helped shaped the trade strategy of the country’s 
government by prioritizing the importance of the relationship within the Pacific Alliance and 
the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, domestic groups have also played their part in foreign policy 
strategy, and have led Colombia to adopt a selective contestation policy towards Brazil. The 
building of economic ties within the Pacific Alliance, and the entry into the Asia-Pacific 
region, thus balances the importance of the Brazilian option (Flemes and Wehner, 2012). 
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Moreover, as advocated for by domestic economic groups, the Pacific Alliance also helps to 
build a leadership capability that may enable competition with Brazil, or at least reduce the 
asymmetry with it (Pastrana and Vera, 2012, 209-216). In sum, Colombia initially soft 
balanced Brazil by negating its leadership and by recognizing such a role for the US, while 
recently it has adopted a more proactive soft-balancing behaviour based on economic 
statecraft and buffering; the latter two tactics resemble in part Chile’s own strategy. 
 Venezuela is a revolutionary country, being so first under the leadership of Hugo 
Chávez (1999–2013) and now continuing to be so with Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) 
standing at the helm (Wehner, forthcoming). Venezuela harbours the ambition of leading in 
the South American region. Thus, contestation is a recurrent phenomenon in the relationship 
with Brazil– as part of the ongoing revolutionary process in which the diffusion of the 
Bolivarian ideal will be key for building up leadership in South America (Burges, this special 
issue; Flemes and Wehner, 2012; Flemes 2009).  
Venezuela’s contestation has been more salient than that of the other three secondary 
powers, because it has tried to openly compete with Brazil for regional leadership. Venezuela 
created an ideologically driven regional project, the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of 
Our America (ALBA), in 2004 – herein Venezuela exerts exclusive leadership and brings 
together left-oriented governments from Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Furthermore, 
it has developed the ideas of a ‘South American NATO’, a regional broadcasting company 
(Telesur) and a development bank (Banco del Sur) – all of which were projects not supported 
by Brazil. As well, Venezuela has concluded numerous bi- and sub-regional energy 
agreements with the Caribbean states (Petrocaribe), the Andean states (Petroandino) and the 
Southern Cone states (Petrosur), who receive Venezuelan oil at favourable prices (Flemes, 
2009, 172-176). This strategy was intended to increase the asymmetrical economic 
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dependence of small powers on Venezuela, thereby giving the latter the necessary leverage to 
exert regional leadership.  
 Most of the aforementioned initiatives were possible because Chávez was able to 
increase the Venezuelan government’s relative autonomy from domestic groups – mainly the 
opposition, but also the country’s legislative and judicial institutions. Domestically, the 
Bolivarian revolution reached a point of consolidation in 2003, and the  resource capacity of 
the state to pursue security and foreign policy goals increased with the definitive re-
nationalization of the oil company PDVSA in that year (Raby, 2011, 163–164). Moreover, 
Chávez’s politics of arms acquisitions from Russia were not only a reflection of how 
Venezuela perceived its security position vis-à-vis the influence of Colombia and the US in 
the region (Jácome, 2011, 3), but also represented the making of a concession to one of its 
main domestic allies in the carrying out of the revolutionary project: the armed forces.  
 However, Venezuela’s strategy of building up leadership in the ALBA has also been 
supplemented by its attempts to increase its presence within the UNASUR, and thus to use 
such a platform to institutionally bind Brazil (see Burges, this special issue). This has also 
been the case for the CELAC. Venezuela was, along with Argentina and Mexico, one of the 
proactive countries in the creation of this regional group, whereas Brazil was not openly in 
favour of it because of competing rationales with Mexico and Venezuela over Central 
America – a disputed zone of influence, and one where the US is also present. Brazil has 
hitherto mainly cast its zone of influence in South America instead (Tokatlian, 2013). Thus, 
some of Venezuela’s contestation of Brazil is based on the former’s interest of exerting 
leadership. However, such contestation has also emerged because of the concessions the 
Venezuelan government gives to those domestic groups that support the revolutionary 
project.  
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Although the new government of Maduro is currently experiencing economic and 
political problems –inflation, public debt, and the strong pressure of groups opposed to the 
government– it has still tried to retain its goal of offering a leadership alternative in South 
America to compete with Brazil and contest the rise of the Pacific Alliance (Wehner, 
forthcoming, footnote 5). These internal problems currently limit the international reach and 
influence of Venezuela, and also serve to dilute the concession–transaction nexus between 
the country’s FPE and domestic interest groups. The outcomes witnessed are thus associated 
with the increased costs that the state now faces in giving concessions to domestic groups, 
and also with its (diminished) capacity to obtain backing from key domestic groups.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has, by way of the South American context, explored from a theoretical 
perspective the domestic drivers underpinning the accommodative strategies of contestation 
chosen by secondary powers vis-à-vis regional powers in regional settings with low levels of 
conflict. The analysis has also given recognition to the importance of systemic drivers, 
offering in this way a balanced perspective on the politics of contestation of secondary 
powers with regards to the regional power. Structure definitely plays its part in the selection 
process of strategies, as secondary powers positions are connected to the soft-balancing 
behaviour required in relatively peaceful regions. However, secondary powers also enjoy a 
significant degree of agency (see Shaw, this special issue), as they choose the tactics with 
which to contest regional powers according to their own interests and relative to the influence 
of key domestic actors – be these members of the same government, of the legislative, of 
economic interest groups, security and defence actors or agents of public opinion.  
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 The theoretical premise of this article was investigated by unpacking the motives and 
dynamics that drive the diverging strategic responses of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela to Brazil’s regional powerhood. Yet, understanding contestation also depends on 
identifying what it is being contested by the secondary power – which depends largely on the 
chosen foreign policy behaviour of the regional power. This was explored theoretically and 
empirically in this work through scrutinizing the case of Brazil. Secondary powers in South 
America rely on soft-balancing, but they nevertheless tend to contest Brazil in a number of 
different ways. Some rely more on institutional binding, others on economic statecraft, or 
buffering, while others contest by offering and building alternative leadership proposals. 
However, the choice by each respective FPE to use one (or more) of these tactics depends, as 
has been shown, on the influence of specific domestic groups. Thus, the divergence in modes 
of contestation is due primarily to circumstances existing at the domestic level. That said, the 
state is ultimately still the principal actor involved in the selection process, as it retains the 
freedom and leeway to prioritize one group over another – the FPEs do this following a cost–
benefit rationale regarding the state’s ability to generate the necessary resources for the 
fulfilment of its overseas goals. 
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